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Abstract
This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces
the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium
framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk
and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian
household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of ra-
tioning by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in
the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to
separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But
even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings,
based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms’ type, based on
incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as
compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.
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Keywords: credit rationing, informal credit markets, self revelation mecha-
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1 Introduction
The core tenets of the financial development and economic growth mainly revolve around
the two broad issues. First, how financial development and economic growth are related to
each other. And, second, how financial development can take place. The former one delves
into the endogeneity issue while the second issue tries to resolve the imperfection in credit
market due to asymmetric information. However, in doing so, most of the studies in the
literature ignored the existence of informal source as one of the components of the broader
credit channel and consider, instead, the formal credit channel as the sole source of external
finance for the firms.
The incorporation of moneylenders’ credit deserves attention because, in the parlance
of development finance, the formal and informal credit channels in most of the developing
countries are either horizontally or vertically integrated to each other. As for instance, in
India, formal and informal credit markets have a horizontal coexistence. Under such an
environment, when these two markets compete with each other, a spillover of excess demand
for credit from formal to informal credit market takes place under credit rationing. This
increases the moneylenders’ bargaining power. They often use this power to interlock credit
contracts with other contracts, mainly, purchase and sale of inputs and final products (Bell,
1990). It is often argued that, such interlocking acts as a disincentive to the firms to invest
efficiently and hence, lowers growth.
Alternatively, in some other developing countries like Philippines (see Floro and Ray
(1997)), informal credit has been attempted to interlink vertically with the formal source
by extending formal funds to a group of informal lenders. In this arrangement, the informal
lenders borrow from formal sector and then re-lend it to the grass root level borrowers. Such
contractual hierarchy is backed up by the belief that the rural moneylenders have a wider
information set as compared to the formal financial sector which, makes it easier for them
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to spread their network at the grass root level.
Therefore, to give our model a more general form, we introduce an informal credit chan-
nel as another source of external funds. Based on the existing set up in Indian context, the
informal sector, in our model, is assumed to be composed of households and rural moneylen-
ders. We resolve the endogeneity issue by using a dynamic general equilibrium framework
with households’ investment decision in human capital. One important consideration in
this regard is the focus on the households’ financial cost in human capital development, not
their cost in terms of time. We consider two different credit regimes - the self revelation
regime based on incentive mechanism and the credit rationing regime– in order to answer
the following questions: First, in the presence of asymmetric information, how does informal
source of credit influence growth under credit rationing when households decide to invest in
human capital? Second, can market clearing loan rates under self revelation regime lead to
higher growth rate? Our first question tries to capture the intricacies of the effect of differ-
ent components of credit on growth. The second one explores the proper way of financial
development in order to achieve higher growth.
We formulate our objectives based on the following literature. According to the early
studies in the literature, like Schumpeter (1911), financial development can act as a catalyst
to economic growth by reallocating resources. But this result is based on a very critical
assumption that the loss due to market imperfections is not substantial. However, many
recent studies have posited some conflicting results which make the relationship ambiguous.
This ambiguity comes mainly from two sources - first, cross country evidence, and, second,
the causal relationship.
Cross country evidence is well documented by the several studies. Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin (1991) find no clear cut relationship between financial development and growth.
Their cross country evidence suggests that while countries with high financial repression
experience low economic growth quite expectedly, some countries with high growth and high
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repression are also quite surprisingly present. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) suggest that the
reason behind such high growth in the highly repressed countries is a higher savings rate.
Jappelli and Pagano argue that credit market imperfections impose borrowing constraints
on consumption loans. The consumers have to save more under such a situation in order to
carry out the unconstrained consumption plan. Under such circumstances, the consumption
loan will increase with a decrease in rationing and will lead to a decline in propensity to
save. As a consequence, the economy will experience lower growth. Or, in nutshell, more
stringent credit rationing leads to higher growth because of households’ higher propensity to
save. In this context, this view and the disincentive effect of the informal credit under credit
rationing from development perspective, as mentioned earlier, do not lead to any general
consensus regarding the effect of credit rationing on growth.
The other source of ambiguity in the literature originates from the endogeneity issue
between growth and financial development. According to King and Levine (1993), financial
development causes economic growth. They support their findings by saying that the prede-
termined components of financial development are good predictors of growth over the next
10 to 30 years.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) hold the same opinion. With cross-country evi-
dence they show that growth is positively related to the stock market turnover and different
measures of law enforcement. Using state level data for the US, Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996) also show a positive influence of liberalization of the banking sector on growth. The
findings of Levine and Zervos (1998) reveal that measures of market liquidity are strongly re-
lated to growth, capital accumulation and productivity. But stock market size is not strongly
related to growth. They also show that bank lending to the private sector has a strong effect
on growth.
While these above mentioned studies show a strong causal relationship between credit
market development and economic growth, some others are not so enthusiastic about this
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relationship. Goldsmith (1969) shows, with empirical evidence, that the one to one cor-
respondence between economic and financial sector development is very weak. The causal
direction may be made confidently with the help of some other factor that links these to-
gether. Rajan and Zingales (1998) points out that the key linking factor between financial
development and growth could be the propensity to save. The effect of endogenous savings
on the long run growth rate of the economy makes the growth and financial development
seem correlated. Moreover, financial development is represented by the size of the stock
market or by the lending activity. The predictive power of the financial market incorporates
the present value of growth opportunities in its own reaction function and foster its own
growth. In the same fashion, lending also increases on the basis of anticipated growth.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) (henceforth, G-J), overcome the causality issue by
considering financial intermediation and economic growth as endogenous in their model.
Financial intermediaries can invest more productively than individuals because of their better
ability to identify investment opportunities. As a result, they can invest more in productive
projects and can foster growth.
The major limitation of the G-J model is that it ignores the problems of asymmetry in
information at the level of the entrepreneurs. Also, the assumption that the intermediary
has a better information set regarding efficient investment projects that entrepreneurs do not
have, in a way, sidelines the adverse selection issue that originates from the heterogenous
borrowers with different degrees of risk.
In our model we ignore this possibility of loan volume augmentation due to expected
growth. In our model banks neither have memory nor are they forward looking. They
maximize each period’s expected profit based on available information. The volume of loan
is decided on the basis of the available information regarding the firms’ type.
Our second objective encompasses this adverse selection problem and tries to answer
it with the help of an incentive compatible pricing mechanism. Several studies address the
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issue regarding the nature of financial development in order to foster economic growth. Many
seminal studies have argued in favor of credit rationing (Jaffe and Russel (1976), Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), Williamson (1987)). Alternatively, there are number of studies (Bester (1985),
Besanko and Thakor (1987)) which, under certain specific situations, favor market clearing
pricing that assures separating equilibrium based on collateral. Most of the above mentioned
studies are purely theoretical.
This study draws heavily from our previous study to lay out the base line model. To suit
our requirements, we incorporate the following specifications in this study. First, we assume
that households invest in human capital. Second, we focus mainly on endogenous growth
in the presence of asymmetric information. As in our earlier study, we consider that firms’
type is private information and not available to banks. Therefore, banks have two options -
either they ration credit in order to hedge against risk, or, devise some mechanism by paying
incentive to the firms so that they tell the truth. In our analysis we examine both options to
find a solution to arrest the adverse selection problem and determine their respective growth
implications.
The introduction of an extra asset like human capital not only assures endogenous growth
in the model but also it determines endogenously households’ tradeoff between households
loan and investment in human capital, given their resource constraint. We also intend to
quantify endogenous growth under the two alternative credit regimes.
The main contribution of this paper is to show quantitatively the difference in growth
path between the alternative regimes, credit rationing and direct revelation in the presence
of asymmetric information, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Our model also
shows that the informal sector influences growth positively and reduces the cost of credit
rationing. With the consideration of heterogenous agents in production, the direct revelation
mechanism acts as a separating tool. This leads the market based incentive compatible
pricing of loan to overcome the dependence of firms on household funds.
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We divided our study into four sections. Section 2 outlines the baseline model. In this
section we set up the two different banking regimes separately and define their corresponding
equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted to quantify our model economy by estimating the steady
state equilibrium values and presents the results. Last section concludes.
2 Baseline Model: An Overview
There are four types of decision makers in our model economy: firms, banks, households
and informal moneylenders. Two types of firms - low risk and high risk, constitute the
production sector. Both types of firms have same level of return when they succeed or fail.
But their probability of success are different and that information is unknown to the banks,
making them ex-ante identical to the banks. Firms lack endowment and therefore they
take production loans either from banks or from informal markets. Both of these loans are
assumed to be perfect substitutes to each other. The wedge in loan rates between formal
and informal credit market drives the firms to borrow first from the formal sector.
Banks offer deposit contracts, maturing in the end of the period. They also sell shares
in the financial market to diversify their risks. Banks convert these deposits and stocks into
loans without any cost and extend them to the firms.
Households maximize their life time utility from consumption and from the sum of loans
being offered by them to the low risk relatives and friends and formal loans by banks. The
reason behind incorporating loans in the utility function is motivated by the data and will
become clear later. Households invest in human capital. The resources devoted to human
capital compete with other investments and consumption.
The total loan volume gives household utility because households are aware of the exor-
bitantly high rate of interest charged by money lenders. They prefer their low risk relatives
or friends not to be dependent on moneylenders for production loans unless they are not cov-
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ered by the formal sector or households. Similarly, households may have friends or relatives
with high risk projects. Priority wise, households always prefer to offer loans to their low
risk relatives or friends first. But because of their resource constraint they can only serve a
fraction of their low risk relatives or friends. Therefore, households always prefer both their
high and low risk relatives or friends to be covered by formal sector. Thus, total volume of
loan offered by formal sector along with low risk households loan gives households a positive
utility.
Households generally do not charge any interest rates for their loans. Households extend
loans only when they know the owner of the firms from very close network like friend or
family members and, the projects taken up by these firms are less risky.
In our model, informal money lenders are risk neutral and lend in the informal market
when the excess demand for loan spills over from the formal market because of credit ra-
tioning. The reallocative effect of credit rationing induces the informal money lenders to
offer more loans in the informal market instead of savings with banks. Moneylenders can,
at a cost, find the risk of the firms they are lending to.
Model Specification
2.1 Households
We assume a large number of identical households in our model who maximize their life time
utility from consumption and lending. The total volume of formal as well as households
loan to firms gives households positive utility. This is because a broader coverage by both
formal and households loans lowers the possibility of the firms’ dependence on informal
moneylenders for loan at higher rates. Labor is considered to be inelastic. Another important
assumption in this regard is that households have private information about the firms’ type
as they are owned by their relatives or friends. The representative household solves the
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following problem :
V = max
Ct,HLR,t,Dt,St,ih,t
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(Ct +
(Lt+Ht)e
e
)1−σ
1− σ
]
(1)
S. T. :
Ct +Dt + St +HLR,t + iht−1 ≤ wt−1kht−1 + (1 + hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1
+ (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1 + St−1)
(2)
kh,t = (1− δ)kh,t−1 + ih,t−1 (3)
where Dt denotes the quantity of goods deposited with the bank at time t, St is real amount
of stock purchased, Ct is real consumption, wt is wage rate, kh,t is human capital, HLR,t is the
amount of household sector loan and hLR,t is the household sector loan rate in real terms, e
is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and loan and δ is the depreciation rate
of human capital. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC), rt or the risk adjusted per
unit cost of deposit and stock at time t. The discount factor β lies in the open unit interval,
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The constant elasticity of substitution parameter σ is strictly positive. In our
case we assume σ = 11.
2.2 Firms
The degree of risk makes firms heterogenous in our model. For simplicity we consider only
two types of firms - low risk and high risk. Firms’ type is private information to themselves
and their relative households or friends. But banks do not have this information. Firms
production process is composed of two stages. In the first stage firms convert their borrowing
into capital. In the second stage firms utilize their capital and hire labor to produce a single
consumption good as final product. Firms can borrow from either banks (the formal credit
1The Euler Equations are given in the Appendix
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market) or from households/moneylenders (the informal one). These two types of loans are
perfect substitutes. Given this backdrop we can write the two stages of firms’ production
process as :
Stage 1: Firms produce their own capital. Firms do not have any initial wealth. So, they
have to borrow in order to produce their capital. Firms produce capital using the following
linear function:
Kt = Lt + Ti,t i = HR,LR (4)
where Kt is the total amount of capital produced. Lt and Ti,t represent amount of loan taken
from banks and from households/moneylenders respectively in period t.
Stage 2: Firms convert their capital into a consumption good. The return of the ith
firm’s project is a random outcome. All successful projects yield the same return, i.e., ψ
percent more output above mean level irrespective of type. Output is zero when they fail.
Only difference is in their rate of success.2 We defined the firms with higher success rate as
the low risk firms (LR) and firms with lower rate of success as the high risk firms. With
corresponding rate of success (φi) the expected production can be written as:
Et[f(kt)] = γiAk
m
t (kh,t)
(1−m) (5)
where
γi = φi(1 + ψ) (6)
The equation of motion for capital takes the following form:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (7)
where it is investment in period t and kt is the per capita capital stock in period t. Firm’s
profit maximization problem can be written as
max
kt,kht
Etpit = γiAk
m
t (kh,t)
(1−m) − (1 + jt)kt − wtkht (8)
2See De Meza and Webb (1987) for a similar assumption
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jt = lt or ht depending upon sources of loan. F.O.C.s w.r.t.
kit : (1 + jit) = γiAm
(
khit
kit
)1−m
(9)
kh,it : wt = γiA(1−m)
(
kit
khit
)m
(10)
From equations (9) and (10) we get demand for formal (Lt) and informal (Tt)loan
Lit = kh,it
(
γiAm
1 + li,t
) 1
1−m
(11)
Tit = khi,t
(
γiAm
1 + hit
) 1
1−m
(12)
khit = kit
(
γiA(1−m)
wt
) 1
m
(13)
i = LR,HR
2.3 Informal money lenders
Moneylenders are the residue claimants of the excess demand for loans from the formal
sector. They are assumed to be risk neutral and maximize their expected profit. One crucial
assumption here is that moneylenders do not have prior information about the firms type.
But since they operate in a small jurisdiction, they can glean this information by incurring
some cost.
Moneylenders maximize their expected profit in the following way:
max
MHR,t,MLR,t
Etpim,t =φHR(1− α)ηhHR,tMHR,t + φLR(1− α)(1− η)(1− λ)hLR,tMLRt
− (cLRMLRt + cHRMHRt)
(14)
where Mi,t is the loan amount offered by the money lenders, φi is the success rate and ci is
the cost coefficient of the ith type of firm in the informal sector3.
3F.O.Cs are given in the Appendix
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2.4 Banks
We consider two regimes: One where there is an interest rate ceiling and uniform interest rate
regardless of firms’ type; this leads to credit rationing. In the other, banks freely set interest
rates and manage to separate good and bad risks with a schedule; this is termed as self
revelation. For most of the developing countries, or even in some developed countries, credit
rationing is used as both profit maximizing as well as risk hedging device against asymmetric
information. In this section we propose an alternative regime, called self revelation regime
to make a comparative study. We compare the steady state growth paths for both regimes.
In this section we first discuss the credit rationing regime with and without informal credit
markets and examine how flow of funds from different sources contribute to growth of the
economy. Then next, we discuss the self revelation regime and its steady state growth path
to compare with the former one.
2.4.1 Credit Rationing Regime
In this case we assume that banks are price takers in the loan market but price in the
deposit and stock markets are endogenous. Banks diversify their risk by equating the price
for combined fund (deposit and stocks) to the weighted cost of capital using the capital asset
pricing model. They have a uniform loan rate, lt, predetermined by the central bank. We
assume that the proportion of high risk firms is ρ and that of low risk firms is (1− ρ). But
banks face a pooled demand from both types of firms as they do not have the information
regarding the type of each firm. Therefore, to hedge against such risk, and due to asymmetric
information, banks ration credit. They decide to cater a fraction of the market demand and
this fraction is endogenously determined so as to maximize profit. Through rationing, banks
turn down some of the borrowers’ demand for loans even if the borrowers are willing to pay
a higher price.
Under credit rationing the funds flow in the following way. Let α be the proportion of
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loan demanded that banks supply under credit rationing regime. If the firm is rationed out
then it goes to the informal market. So, with probability (1 − α), firms go to the informal
market to get loans. This implies that the banks supply only αLDt if the total revealed
demand for loan is LDt in the formal sector. The pool will be identical because the high
demand firms will take the guise of the low demand firms for the formal loan. In this way
high demand firms can reap the benefit of certain amount of surplus if they operate on the
lower demand curve in the guise of low demand firms. They fulfil their extra demand from
the informal market supply. Let us consider
LFDt = kht
[
ρ
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
+ (1− ρ)
(
γLRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
]
(15)
be the actual demand generated from both high risk and low risk firms. But total demand
revealed in the formal market from the identical pool will be
LDt = kht
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
In that case total supply of formal loan will be
LSt = αkht
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
(16)
Now, the part of total demand for loan that is hidden from the formal sector by the low risk
firms to maintain an identical pool is
kht
[
ρ
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
+ (1− ρ)
(
γLRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
−
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
]
(17)
or,
kht(1− ρ)
[(
γLRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
−
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
]
(18)
Thus, the demand for informal loan is composed of the current revealed demand and the
hidden demand:∑
i=LR,HR
Ti,t = kht
[
(1− α)
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
+ (1− ρ)
((
γLRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
−
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
)]
(19)
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where
∑
i=LR,HR Ti,t is the total demand for informal loan. If we denote η by the proportion
of high risk firms in the informal demand mix then demand from the high risk firms that
goes to the moneylenders is
MHR,t = khtη(1− α)
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
(20)
The rest of the informal loan demand comes from the low risk firms which is equal to
TLR,t = kht
[
(1− α)(1− η)
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
+ (1− ρ)
((
γLRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
−
(
γHRAm
1 + lt
) 1
1−m
)]
(21)
Households cannot supply all of this. Denote by λ, the share they provide to low risk
firms at a very low (in the equilibrium it is zero) interest rate. In that case, the supply of
household sector loan will be
HLR,t = khtλ
(
Am
1 + l
) 1
1−m
[
γ
1
1−m
HR,t(ρ+ ηα− η − α) + (1− ρ)γ
1
1−m
LR,t
]
(22)
and rest of the demand from residual low risk firms goes to the moneylenders. Therefore,
demand for moneylenders loan from low risk firms will be
MLR,t = kht(1− λ)
(
Am
1 + l
) 1
1−m
[
γ
1
1−m
HR,t(ρ+ ηα− η − α) + (1− ρ)γ
1
1−m
LR,t
]
(23)
Before we set up banks’ profit maximizing problem under the credit rationing regime, we
want to assume that
i. banks get return only from loan it extends. Rest of the funds it keeps with the central
bank as non-interest bearing asset.
ii. banks have sufficient funds to cater to the total demand for loans in the formal market.
In that case, banks’ profit maximization problem can be written as
max
Lt,α
E[piBt ] = αφHRltL
D
t − rt(Dt + St) (24)
S. T. Dt + St ≥ LDt (25)
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Solving for α∗ from the zero profit condition, we get
α∗ =
rt
ltφHR
(26)
In the deposit market the weighted average cost of capital, rt−1, or, the uniform rate for
deposit and stocks is obtained from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), rt can be
constructed as
rt−1 =
rd,t−1Dt−1
(Dt−1 + St−1)
+
ps,t−1St−1
(Dt−1 + St−1)
(27)
where,
ps,t−1 = rd,t−1 + [E(rmt)− rd,t−1]µ (28)
and,
µ =
Cov(St−1, rmt)
Var(rmt)
(29)
where rd,t−1 is deposit rate in period t− 1, ps,t−1 is price of securities, E[rm,t] is the expected
market price in period t.
Equilibrium and Balanced-Growth Equations: Credit Rationing Regime
An equilibrium in this model economy is a sequence of prices {wt, rt, hLR,t, hHR,t}∞t=0, allo-
cations, {ct, ikht, ikt}∞t=0, stock of physical and human capital, {kt, kht}∞t=0, stock of financial
assets, {Dt, St, Ht,MLR,t,MHR,t, Lt}∞t=0, and policy variables
{
rd,t, lt
}∞
t=0
, such that :
1. The allocations and stocks of financial assets solve the household’s date t maximization
problem, equation (1), given prices and policy variables.
2. The real allocations solve the firm’s date t profit maximization problem, Equation (12),
given prices and policy variables.
3. The stock of financial assets solve informal money lender’s maximization problem,
equation (18), given prices and policy variable.
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4. The stock of financial assets solve the bank’s date t profit maximization problem,
equation (30), given prices and policy variables.
5. The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: kt = Lt+Tt where Tt = λ(1−η)(1−
α)Ht + (1− λ)(1− η)(1− α)MLRt + η(1− α)MHRt and Lt = α(Dt + St).
6. Goods market equilibrium condition satisfies ct + ih,t + it = f(kt) for all t.
To calculate the balanced growth equations we use the solutions to the maximization prob-
lems of households, banks, firms and the informal moneylenders together with the equilibrium
conditions. Along this balanced growth path output grows at a constant rate. The economy
is characterized by the following balanced growth equations:
1. Households’ utility maximization with respect to HLR and kh, leads to the following
supply of household sector loan
Hs =
(
wt + 1− δ
wt + 2− δ
) 1
1−e
− Ls (30)
Equating above households loan supply with demand (equation (22)) from firms we
find the value of λ, i.e, proportion of low risk loan that households supplies under credit
rationing.
λ =
(
Hss
kh
)
(Am)
1
1−m
[
γ
1
1−m
HR,t(ρ+ ηα− η − α) + (1− ρ)γ
1
1−m
LR,t
] (31)
2. From equation (16) we get total supply of formal loan by banks
L
kh
= α
(
γHAm
1 + l
) 1
1−m
(32)
3. From equation (20) we get high risk moneylender’s loan
MHR
kh
= η(1− α)
(
γHAm
1 + l
) 1
1−m
(33)
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4. From equation (23) we get money lender’s supply of low risk loan
MLR
kh
= (1− λ)
(
Am
1 + l
) 1
1−m
[
γ
1
1−m
HR (ρ+ ηα− η − α) + (1− ρ)γ
1
1−m
LR
]
(34)
5. From equation (31) to (34), capital per unit of human capital
k
kh
=
L
kh
+ ((1− α)(1− η)λ)H
kh
+ (1− α)ηMHR
kh
+ (1− α)(1− η)(1− λ)MLR
kh
(35)
6. From households utility maximization with respect to deposit or stock and firms’ profit
maximization with respect to capital (equation (9)) we get
r = γiA(1−m)( k
kh
)m − δ (36)
7. From the above equation and equation (27) we get the growth rate
gcr = β
(
1 + (γiA(1−m)( k
kh
)m − δ)
)
(37)
2.4.2 Self-Revelation Regime
We propose an alternative regime to credit rationing, termed as self revelation regime to
compare relative performances of banks under different regimes. We characterize this regime
as a sequential communication game with intermediation plan. The formulation of our model
under this regime is done in the line of Myerson (1979). According to him the revelation
mechanism is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under induced communication game. Thus, a
mediation plan is incentive compatible iff it is a Bayesian equilibrium for all players to
report their types honestly and to obey the mediator’s recommendations when she uses the
mediation plan. In a communication game there may be many Bayesian equilibria but a
direct mechanism with truth telling leads to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium
is also known as the incentive compatible equilibrium (Gibbons (1992)). In short, truth
telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium iff it is incentive compatible.
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In our model, banks under this regime are assumed to be monopolistically competitive
and set prices for differentiated loans based on their communication with the firms. Banks
are assumed to disburse loan to different types of investment projects at different rates
instead of a single prime lending rate. Loans are intended to be differentiated on the basis of
the associated degree of risk. But banks have asymmetric information on each individual’s
type. In this situation banks formulate an incentive mechanism based on demand such that
each firm self-selects.
We set up the bank’s maximization problem by using information taken from firms’
maximization problem. Between two types of firms in our model,
1. high risk firms with lower demand coefficient, γHR, operate on a lower demand curve.
Therefore, banks set the price to a level that helps the banks to take away all the
surplus from high risk firms. For the high risk firms participation constraint is binding
- i.e,
Et[RHR,t] = φHRLHR,tlHR,t (38)
where Et[RHR,t] is the expected total revenue from the high risk firms.
2. low risk firms with higher demand coefficient, γLR, should operate on a higher demand
curve. But they operate on the lower demand curve instead along with the high risk
firms. The incentives that drives them to do so is the surplus they can enjoy by
hiding their type. This creates an adverse selection problem. Therefore, under the self
selection regime, low risk firms should be bounded by the incentive constraint.
Under the revelation equilibrium, the borrowers will reveal their type only if their pooling
payoff is assured. To do that banks need to know the actual surplus the low risk firms were
enjoying. From the two demand functions, the willingness to pay for the high risk firm for
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any given level of loan is
1 + lHR,t =
γHRAmk
1−m
ht
(LHR,t)1−m
(39)
and that for the low risk firm is
1 + lLR,t =
γLRAmk
1−m
ht
(LHR,t)1−m
(40)
The difference of the above two equations determines that the low risk firms have γLR−γHR
L1−mHR,t
times higher willingness to pay for the same amount of loan. In this case, the amount of
surplus the low risk or high demand firms enjoy from LHR,t unit of loan is
Qt = k
1−m
ht
[
γLRAm
(LHR,t)1−m
− γHRAm
(LHR,t)1−m
]
LHR,t (41)
Or,
= Amk1−mht L
m
HR,t(γLR − γHR). (42)
where Qt is total surplus. The estimated surplus leads to the following incentive constraint
for the high demand or low risk firms to self select themselves is
Et[RLR,t] = φLRLLR,tlLR,t − Amk1−mht LmHR,t(γLR − γHR) (43)
where Et[RLR,t] is the expected revenue from low risk firms, LLR,t and LHR,t are the loan
amount for low risk and high risk firms and lLR,t is the loan rate for low risk firms. Banks
can induce the firms with high demand to disclose their type by promising to return the
surplus they were enjoying and can motivate the low risk firm to demand for LLR,t amount
instead of LHR,t. Now with ρ as the fraction of high risk firms and (1− ρ) as the fraction of
low risk firms, banks’ profit maximization problem can be written as :
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max
LLR,t,LHR,t
EtΠ
B
t = ρEt(RHR,t) + (1− ρ)Et(RLR,t)− rt(Dt + St) (44)
S.T. EtRLR,t = φLRLLR,t(lLR,t)− Amk1−mht LmHR,t(γLR − γHR) (45)
EtRHR,t = φHRLHR,t(lHR,t) (46)
Dt + St = ρLHR,t + (1− ρ)LLR,t (47)
From the F.O.Cs w.r.t LHR,t and LLR,t we get :
l∗HR,t =
rt
φHR
+
(1− ρ)
ρφHR
Am2(γLR − γHR)
(LHR,t)1−m
(48)
l∗LR,t =
rt
φLR
(49)
These F.O.Cs show that for low risk firms with higher demand coefficient, banks’ marginal
benefit is equal to their marginal cost. Where as for the high risk firms, banks’ marginal
benefit is greater than their marginal cost. This extra amount can be considered as the
premium that banks charge to the high risk firms to hedge against their vulnerability to
default.
One important assumption to make this mechanism work is that banks do not breach the
ex ante contract at the end of the contract period. If they do, the self revelation mechanism
does not hold intertemporally. This assumption is rational because when all the banks are
operating under revelation regime then by cheating ex post, the violator comes back to the
rationing equilibrium. But in that case, only high risk firms will come to this bank because
low risk firms do not have any incentive to come back to this bank by leaving lower rate of
interest being offered by other banks. This will decrease the violator bank’s expected pay
off. Therefore, when this self selection is reached by firms under revelation mechanism no
bank will have a tendency to breach the contract.
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Equilibrium and Balanced-Growth Equations: Self Revelation Regime
An equilibrium in this model economy is a sequence of prices {wt, rt, lLR,t, lHR,t}∞t=0, alloca-
tions, {ct, ikht, ikt}∞t=0, stock of financial assets, {Dt, St, Lt}∞t=0, and policy variables {rd,t}∞t=0,
such that :
1. The allocations and stocks of financial assets solve the household’s date t maximization
problem, equation (1), given prices and policy variables.
2. The real allocations solve the firm’s date t profit maximization problem, Equation (12),
given prices and policy variables.
3. The stock of financial assets solve the bank’s date t profit maximization problem,
equation (50), given prices and policy variables.
4. The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: Lt
kht
=ρ
LHR,t
kht
+ (1− ρ)LLR,t
kht
.
5. Goods market equilibrium condition satisfies Ct
kht
+
ih,t
kht
+ it
kht
= f(kt)
kht
for all t.
6. The labor market equilibrium condition : kdht = k
s
ht.
To calculate the balanced growth equations we use the solutions to the maximization prob-
lems of households, banks, firms and the informal moneylenders together with the equilibrium
conditions. Along this balanced growth path output grows at a constant rate. The economy
is characterized by the following balanced growth equations:
1. By equating high risk firms’ willingness to pay from Equation (13) with banks’ will-
ingness to accept, Equation (54), we get the optimum value of high risk loan supplied
LssHR
kh
=
(
Am(φHRγHRρ−m(1− ρ)(γLR − γHR)
ρ(φHR + rss)
) 1
1−m
(50)
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2. By equating low risk firms’ willingness to pay from Equation (13) with banks’ willing-
ness to accept, Equation (55), we get the optimum value of low risk loan supplied
LssLR
kh
=
(
φLRγLRAm
φLR + rss
) 1
1−m
(51)
3. By using the optimum high risk loan amount in Equation (54), we get the optimum
loan rate for high risk loan
lssHR =
γHRρr
ss +m(1− ρ)(γLR − γHR)
φHRγHRρ−m(1− ρ)(γLR − γHR) (52)
4. From Equation (55) we get the low risk loan rate,
lssLR =
rss
φLR
(53)
Notice that this rate is exactly equal to the banks’ marginal cost.
5. Capital accumulation under this regime is
kss
kssh
= ρ
LssHR
kssh
+ (1− ρ)L
ss
LR
kssh
(54)
6. Growth rate under self revelation regime is
gsr = β
(
1 + γiA(1−m)( k
kh
)m − δ
)
(55)
3 Calibration
In order to obtain the quantitative values of the impact of the various credit regimes, we
proceed to the calibration of the model. We do this for India, which is currently under
rationing regime. We quantify our model by estimating the parameter values from their
steady state equilibrium relationships. Some macro economic indicators like inflation rate,
real deposit rate, and real rate of return on securities (Table 1) for the years from 1970 to
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2000 have been taken from Sirai (2002). The share of capital has been estimated from the
National Income Accounting data for India by deducting the labor share from the real GDP
at factor cost. We estimated rt, the WACC from the deposit rate and stock prices.
[Table 1 comes here]
Some other parameter values, as mentioned below, are estimated from the agricultural
household level sample (Agro-economic Research Centers and Units, Ministry of Agriculture,
Government of India for the years 1997-2000) we used for that analysis.
Based on the characteristics of the firms with known types in the subset of informal
borrowers, we used discriminant analysis to separate the firms from a unknown pool of high
and low risk firms in the formal sector.
[Figure 1 comes here]
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of informal borrowers with respect to loan rate is tri-
modal and the first mode is at 0 percent real interest rate. As per our consideration of the
households benevolent loan to their low risk friends and family members for production we
define this borrowers as the low risk borrowers and based on their characteristics we separate
the low risk from the high risk in the entire credit market. To validate our claim that all
the borrowers who get loans at zero percent interest are low risk, we test the following
hypotheses:
• borrowers with diversified sources of income are low risk.
• Use of child labor is more by high risk firms as compared to the low risk firms.
• High risk firms have higher probability of default. The representation of the results in
Table 2 validate our claim.
[Table 2 comes here]
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The following parameter values have been estimated using discriminant analysis. The
estimated averages of these parameters are :
i. ρ = Proportion of high risk firms among the total borrowers = .54.
ii. φHR = Success rate of the high risk firms = .78.
iii. φLR = Success rate of the low risk firms = .86.
iv. γLR = Demand coefficient for low risk firms = 1.56.
v. γHR = Demand coefficient for high risk firms = 1.41.
vi. η = The proportion of high risk firms in the informal market = .38.
vii. x = Proportion of high risk firms in the formal market = .72.
The technological parameter, A, has been calculated from equation (42). We used the value
of r and k
kh
from the available data. The estimated value of A is .23. The percent deviation
of the actual output from the estimated output, ψ, has been estimated from the following
regression model:
log(output) = A+mi ∗ log(inputs)
We consider this deviation as the measure of percentage gain in output when the firms
are successful irrespective of their type. The estimated value is .81.
Among the behaviorial parameters used in the baseline computational experiments, the
estimated value of β is .98 and σ is assumed to be 1.
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4 Results
Table 3 and 4 present the equilibrium values of different variables under different policy
regimes. Our findings (Table 3) suggest that the uniform loan rate under credit rationing
is set at such a high level that it is almost equal to the high risk loan rate under self
revelation regime. This indicates that, due to the lack of proper information, the banks
hedge against the default risk of the high risk firms by charging a high premium from all
borrowers irrespective of their type.
[Table 3 comes here]
Another important finding is the improvement in the average wage rate from credit rationing
to the self revelation regime. The average increase is around 12.5 percent. If we consider
the wage rate as the representation of the human capital formation, then it can be said that
such increase in wage rate is the outcome of the absence of households’ tradeoff between loan
and human capital development as we see under credit rationing.
The self revelation regime in our model is incentive compatible because the banks not
only charge a much lower loan rate for the low risk firms but also provide a larger amount
if they reveal their type. By revealing types low risk firms are also better off, both, with
respect to loan rate and loan volume. This incentive compatibility of the loan contract leads
to an overall increase in capital formation and higher growth rate.
The low risk firms are better off, both, with respect to loan rate and loan volume. The
banks not only charge a much lower loan rate for the low risk firms but also provide a larger
amount (Table 4). This leads to an overall increase in capital formation and higher growth
rate.
[Table 4 comes here]
Note that, we consider the ratio of the variables to human capital, kh, instead of output
or physical capital, k. In this study we want to show how households’ resource allocation
25
decision in different investment projects, particularly, in human capital, affects the overall
growth. Moreover, technically, as we know all variables grow at the same rate under balanced
growth path, i.e.,
yt+1
yt
= kt+1
kt
=
kh,t+1
kh,t
= g. A simple reorganization gives us kt
kh,t
= k,t+1
kh,t+1
= g without any loss.
[Table 5 comes here]
The above Table 5 compares the steady state growth rates under different regimes. While
the first two rows of this table indicates correspond the growth rates under credit rationing
without and with informal sector respectively, the third row represents the growth rate under
self revelation regime. The absence of informal sector is a hypothetical situation that we
consider here to separate out the importance of informal sector under credit rationing. Since
rationing decision in the formal sector is independent of the existence of informal sector, we
consider the supply of formal loan as the total supply of loan under credit rationing without
informal sector. Based on that we estimated total capital formation and rate of growth.
The situation with informal sector represents the actual situation in the Indian context.
This separation of situations under credit rationing shows that the higher growth rate in
the presence of informal credit market represents the contribution of this market in reducing
the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth rate. As our results indicate, the incidence of
informal market contributes about .7 percent to the over all growth.
A comparison of the credit rationing regime with our proposed revelation regime shows
that this improvement in growth is not optimal. A change in regime from credit rationing
to self-revelation can increase growth rate by more than 2 percent, as compared to credit
rationing even with informal credit market.
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4.1 Robustness
The two key parameters in our model under credit rationing are α, the proportion of credit
rationing, and λ the proportion of household sector loans to the total low risk loan. We
checked the robustness of our model by estimating the variation in different components of
loans, capital and growth rate for the values of α and λ available in the sample data instead
of taking it from our model. The following Table 6 represents these comparative values. Our
findings in this regard suggest that the values estimated from our model is very consistent
with their counterpart in the sample data.
[Table 6 comes here]
We calibrate our model for different values of φHR, the success rate of the high risk firms
and ρ, the incidence of high risk firms, for both the regimes.4 We also test the robustness
by calibrating our model for different values of deposit rates under two different regimes.
Table 7 represents a comparison of capital-human capital ratio between the two regimes
while Table 8 compares the change in marginal product of capital between these two regimes
as represented by corresponding wage rates. In Table 9 we compare the growth rates for
different combination of φHR and ρ. Table 10 shows the comparative study of growth rates
between two regimes for different deposit rates.
[Table 7 and 8 come here]
Both Table 7 and Table 8 suggest that capital-human capital ratio and marginal product
of labor are always higher under self revelation regime than those under credit rationing
regime for any combination of φHR and ρ. Naturally, the rate of growth also follow the
same pattern as capital-human capital ratio or MPL does. This validates our claim that
4We ignore the rate of success of the high risk firms below .4. Because below this level banks zero profit
condition will not be achieved even for a value of α equals to 1.
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self revelation leads to higher growth rate as compared to credit rationing, and with large
differences.
[Table 9 and 10 come here]
The above Table 10 captures the implications of change in deposit rate on capital accumu-
lation and growth for both the regime. The highest value of real rd is .057 during the period
of 1970 to 2000. Therefore, to keep a parity with the variation in deposit rate during this
period, we estimated the capital accumulation and growth for the corresponding deposit rate
within a range of .01 to .055. In the process of calibration we assumed the other parameter
values as well as the spread between the administered loan rate and the deposit rate un-
der credit rationing as fixed. Our findings suggest that for any value of the deposit rate,
both, capital accumulation and the growth rate are significantly higher in the self revelation
regime.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we quantify the endogenous growth for two alternative credit regimes in the
presence of informal credit market. We used a dynamic general equilibrium framework to
capture the overall changes in the economy. The main contribution of this paper is mainly
twofold. First, we show quantitatively the consequences of credit rationing in terms of growth
under asymmetric information. We show in our model that under credit rationing, growth
rate is 0.7 percent higher in the presence of informal sector than without it. Second, the
incentive compatible self revelation mechanism can increase growth rate by 2 percent as
compared to credit rationing with informal sector.
The uniform loan rate under credit rationing is set at such a higher level that it is almost
equal to the high risk loan rate under self revelation regime. This indicates that, due to the
lack of proper information, the banks hedge against the default risk of the high risk firms by
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charging a high premium to all the borrowers irrespective of their type. Banks’ inability to
separate firms from each other aggravates the adverse selection problem in the formal credit
market leading to a much severe credit rationing and lower growth.
The presence of informal market reduces such cost of credit rationing in terms of growth
by providing more loans to the rejected low risk borrowers as compared to high risk borrowers.
This is possible because of the availability of more information to the household sector as
compared to the formal sector. Moneylenders also separate the low risk borrowers from high
risk borrowers by incurring a certain cost. This leads to higher growth with informal credit
market as compared to credit rationing with no informal market.
But, despite such improvement in capital accumulation and growth, the overall outcome
still remains suboptimal. Our second contribution in this respect suggest that when the low
risk firms reveal their type because of incentive compatibility under revelation it leads to a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium among many other Bayesian equilibria. We can therefore
say that the revelation regime leads us to the optimal achievable growth rate by separating
firms based on their type.
The self revelation regime in our model is incentive compatible because the banks not
only charge a much lower loan rate for the low risk firms but also provide a larger amount
if they reveal their type. By revealing types low risk firms are also better off, both, with
respect to loan rate and loan volume. This incentive compatibility of the loan contract leads
to an overall increase in capital formation and higher growth rate.
Another important finding is the improvement in the average wage rate from credit
rationing to the self revelation regime. The average increase is around 12.5 percent. We can
consider this improvement in wage rate as the representation of the improvement in human
capital formation.
The calibration results for different values of the proportion of high risk firms, ρ, and
the success rate of the high risk firms, φHR, suggest that capital accumulation, wage rate
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and growth rate are always well above the corresponding values under the credit rationing.
The calibration with respect to different deposit rates also corroborates this result. These
findings suggest that the self revelation regime leads to a superior steady state equilibrium
in terms of growth as compared to credit rationing.
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Appendix
• The representative household solves the following problem :
V = max
Ct,HLR,t,Dt,St,ih,t
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(Ct +
(Lt+Ht)e
e
)1−σ
1− σ
]
S. T. :
Ct +Dt + St +HLR,t + iht−1 ≤ wt−1kht−1 + (1 + hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1
+ (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1 + St−1)
kh,t = (1− δ)kh,t−1 + ih,t−1
Details about the parameters and the variables used have been given in the text. The
Euler equations are
Dt :
wtkht+(1+hLR,t)HLR,t+(1+rt)(Dt+St)+
(Lt+1+HLR,t+1)
e
e +iht−Dt+1−St+1−Ht+1
wt−1kht−1+(1+hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1+(1+rt−1)(Dt−1+St−1)+
(Lt+Ht)e
e +iht−1−Dt−St−Ht
= β(1 + rt)
St :
wtkht+(1+hLR,t)HLR,t+(1+rt)(Dt+St)+
(Lt+1+Ht+1)
e
e −iht−Dt+1−St+1−Ht+1
wt−1kht−1+(1+hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1+(1+rt−1)(Dt−1+St−1)+
(Lt+Ht)e
e −iht−1−Dt−St−Ht
= β(1 + rt)
HLR,t :
wtkht+(1+hLR,t)HLR,t+(1+rt)(Dt+St)+
(Lt+1+HLR,t+1)
e
e −iht−Dt+1−St+1−Ht+1
wt−1kht−1+(1+hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1+(1+rt−1)(Dt−1+St−1)+
(Lt+Ht)e
e −iht−1−Dt−St−Ht
= β(1+hLR,t)
Lt+H
−(1−e)
t −1
kht :
wtkht+(1+hLR,t)HLR,t+(1+rt)(Dt+St)+
(Lt+1+HLR,t+1)
e
e −iht−Dt+1−St+1−Ht+1
wt−1kht−1+(1+hLR,t−1)HLR,t−1+(1+rt−1)(Dt−1+St−1)+
(Lt+Ht)e
e −iht−1−Dt−St−Ht
= β(wt + 1− δ)
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• Moneylenders maximize their expected profit in the following way:
max
MHR,t,MLR,t
Etpim,t =φHR(1− α)ηhHR,tMHR,t + φLR(1− α)(1− η)(1− λ)hLR,tMLRt
− (cLRMLRt + cHRMHRt)
Details about the parameters and the variables used have been given in the text. F.O.C
with respect to MHR,t and MLR,t :
MHR,t : hHR,t =
cHR
(1− α)ηφHR
MLR,t : hLR,t =
cLR
(1− η)(1− α)(1− λ)φLR
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Tables
Table 1: Some Policy Parameters and their Corresponding Values
Parameters Description Value
pi Inflation rate .087
rd Real deposit rate .096
ps Real rate of return on securities .028
r Weighted Average of cost of capital .020
m Share of capital in production .24
Table 2: Mean Estimated Values of Certain Indicator Variables Across High
Risk and Low Risk Firms
Variables High risk Low risk
Percent of firms .54 .46
percent child labor used .38 .06
Percent income from secondary sources .03 .30
Percent household members engaged in agriculture .84 .39
Default rate in formal sector .21 .12
Default rate in informal sector .29 .15
Average default rate in both the sector .22 .15
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Table 3: Equilibrium Proportions and Rates Under Different Regimes
Under Credit Rationing Under Self Selection
Parameter Description High risk Low risk High risk Low risk
α Fraction of credit rationing .484 .484 - -
δ Depreciation rate .03 .03 .03 .03
λ Proportion of low risk households loan - .08 - -
lss Bank loan rate .053 .053 .055 .023
hss Informal sector loan rate .270 .150 - -
c Cost coefficient for moneylenders’ loan .042 .038 - -
w Wage rate .096 .106 .108 .119
Table 4 : Steady State Ratios of Real Sector Variables to Human Capital
Across Regimes
Parameters Description CR SR
Lss
kssh
Formal loan to human capital ratio .0150 .0340
Hss
kssh
Household loan to human capital ratio .01 -
MssHR
kssh
Moneylenders’ high risk loan to human capital ratio .006 -
MssLR
kssh
Moneylenders’ low risk loan to human capital ratio .011 -
Css
kssh
Consumption-human capital ratio .0900 .1002
iss
kssh
Investment-human capital ratio .0016 .0052
Dss+Sss
kssh
Loanable Fund-human capital ratio .0150 .0340
kss
kssh
Capital-human capital ratio .0200 .0340
Table 5: Steady State Growth Rates under Different Regimes
Parameters Description Net Growth Rate (Percent)
gcrf Under credit rationing, without informal sector 3.8
gcr Under credit rationing with informal sector 4.5
gsr Under self revelation 6.6
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Table 6: Comparison of Values Between the Model and Sample Data
Parameter/variable α and λ calibrated α and λ from sample
α .485 .502
λ .080 .072
l .053 .051
L
kh
.0156 .0162
MHR
kh
.0063 .0060
MLR
kh
.0061 .0056
k
kh
.0187 .0190
gcr 4.36 4.38
Table 7: Comparison of k
kh
between Two Regimes for Different ρ and φHR
ρ = .1 ρ = .25 ρ = .5 ρ = .75 ρ = .9
φHR
ksr
kh
kcr
kh
ksr
kh
kcr
kh
ksr
kh
kcr
kh
ksr
kh
kcr
kh
ksr
kh
kcr
kh
.4 .0343 .0132 .0286 .0131 .0205 .0129 .0166 .0127 .0146 .0127
.5 .0343 .0156 .0286 .0153 .0242 .0147 .0211 .0141 .0193 .0138
.6 .0343 .0173 .0308 .0169 .0281 .0162 .0256 .0155 .0243 .0151
.7 .0349 .0185 .0336 .0182 .0320 .0176 .0304 .0171 .0294 .0168
.78 .0364 .0192 .0359 .0191 .0350 .0188 .0342 .0184 .0337 .0183
Table 8: Comparison of Wage Rate or Marginal Product of Labor Between
Two Regimes for Different Values of ρ and φHR
ρ = .1 ρ = .25 ρ = .5 ρ = .75 ρ = .9
φHR wcr wsr wcr wsr wcr wsr wcr wsr wcr wsr
.4 .0872 .1202 .0870 .1134 .0867 .1021 .0865 .0947 .0864 .0904
.5 .0909 .1202 .0903 .1134 .0894 .1063 .0885 .1002 .0881 .0966
.6 .0931 .1202 .0926 .1154 .0916 .1102 .0907 .1051 .0901 .1020
.7 .0946 .1207 .0942 .1179 .0935 .1136 .0928 .1094 .0924 .1069
.78 .0954 .1220 .0952 .1197 .0949 .1161 .0945 .1125 .0943 .1104
Note: wcr and wsr represent the wage rates under credit rationing and self revelation regime respectively.
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Table 9: Comparison of Growth Rates (in Percent) Between Two Regimes for
Different Values of ρ and φHR
ρ = .1 ρ = .25 ρ = .5 ρ = .75 ρ = .9
φHR gcr gsr gcr gsr gcr gsr gcr gsr gcr gsr
.4 4.4 6.8 4.3 6.2 4.0 5.1 3.8 4.3 3.6 3.9
.5 4.8 6.8 4.6 6.2 4.3 5.5 4.0 4.9 3.8 4.5
.6 5.1 6.8 4.9 6.4 4.5 5.9 4.2 5.4 4.0 5.1
.7 5.2 6.9 5.0 6.6 4.6 6.2 4.4 5.8 4.2 5.5
.78 5.3 7.0 5.1 6.8 4.9 6.4 4.6 6.1 4.4 5.9
Note: gcr and gsr represent net growth rate under credit rationing and self revelation regime respectively.
Table 10: Comparison of Growth Rates (in Percent) Between Two Regimes for Different
Deposit Rates
CreditRationing SelfRevelation
rd
kcr
kh
gcr
ksr
kh
gsr
0.01 0.014 3.37 0.026 4.52
0.015 0.017 4.18 0.030 5.40
0.02 0.021 5.06 0.035 6.32
0.025 0.025 5.99 0.039 7.27
0.03 0.029 6.97 0.043 8.25
0.035 0.0334 7.98 0.0477 9.26
0.04 0.038 9.03 0.052 10.29
0.045 0.043 10.11 0.057 11.33
0.05 0.048 11.22 0.061 12.40
0.055 0.053 12.34 0.066 13.49
Note: rd is deposit rate.
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Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of Number of Borrowers in the Informal Market
Across Different Rates of Interest
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